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1. Introduction 
The euro crisis illustrates the deficiencies of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union 
characterized by a large heterogeneity. Adjustment mechanisms are defined in a broad sense 
as mechanisms that ensure a return to the initial situation or, possibly, to recover towards full 
employment after a slowdown. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, they are very 
few alternative mechanisms. Fiscal policy could play an active role. In a federal state like the 
USA its stabilization coefficient is around 20% (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992). But there is 
no equivalent in the European case. Well integrated capital markets, with portfolio 
diversification and intra-zone credit, have been proposed as a powerful adjustment 
mechanism by the “international risk sharing” approach. Intra-zone credit and capital income 
from international portfolio would have stabilization coefficients around 20-30% each 
(Asdrubali and Kim, 2004). These results have been used during the 2000 by proponents of 
liberal economic policies in the EU to promote deeper financial integration without having to 
develop a federal budget (European Commission, 2007; Trichet, 2007). However, the 
theoretical basis and the results appear highly questionable (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011). 
Consequently, relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least 
partially, of exchange rate adjustments. Actually these mechanisms allow only a very slow 
and partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment 
and with large differences between countries, due to huge structural specificities. They are 
more inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it 
is the case in the eurozone, especially in the Southern European countries (Mazier and Saglio, 
2008). 
This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole eurozone, the current 
account is close to equilibrium and the fiscal deficit is smaller than in many other OECD 
countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But intra-European imbalances are huge. 
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The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and 
largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany (Jeong et al., 
2010). These overvaluations slow growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South 
while undervaluations boost growth in the North via exports, especially towards the rest of the 
eurozone, and deficit are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in 
favor on the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely 
ignored in the public debate. 
In order to investigate these issues, Duwicquet et al. (2013) have used an SFC model of a 
monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2006, 2007a, 
2007b), Lavoie (2003) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010, 2011). The model described the real 
sector and assets and liabilities of economic agents in order to analyze financial integration in 
a consistent manner. A federal budget has been introduced with federal expenditures and 
social transfers financed by federal taxes and eurobonds issuing. Three results have been 
obtained. The stabilizing role of such a federal budget has been confirmed facing asymmetric 
shocks or exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing 
role of eurobonds used to finance European investment projects has been illustrated. But the 
model was limited to exogenous interest rates, which can only be regarded as a first step, as 
we have assisted to large movements of interest rates in Southern European countries since 
the onset of the euro crisis.  
The paper is organized as follow. In a first part, we give a new evaluation of these exchange 
rate misalignments inside the eurozone, using a FEER approach, and we discuss the evolution 
of real effective exchange rates within the eurozone. In a second part, we present an extended 
version with endogenous interest rates of an SFC model of a monetary union. With this 
model, we examine to what extent asymmetric evolutions implied to intra-European 
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misalignments can be adjusted. Interest rates on public bonds are now endogenous. Fiscal 
policy is also partly endogenous and reacts to financial markets evolution. The possibility to 
increase intra-zone financing allows a reduction of the pressure on interest rates. Eurobonds 
are introduced and used in two ways, on the one hand, in order to pool a part of the European 
public debts and, in the other hand, to finance European investments in growth sectors. 
2. Intra-European exchange rates misalignments 
2.1. A structural heterogeneity 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, we observe a surge of current account imbalances inside the 
Eurozone in spite of a rather balanced current account for the whole area. On the one side, 
Northern European countries have accumulated huge current account surpluses and on the 
other side, Southern European countries have ran important current account deficits (see 
figure 1). These evolutions reflect, at least partially, the increasing heterogeneity of exchange 
rate misalignments inside the Eurozone. By using a FEER approach, introduced by 
Williamson (1983), Jeong et al. (2010) have shown that Northern countries were increasingly 
undervalued and Southern countries increasingly overvalued. 
Since 2009, current account deficits of Southern European countries have been reduced 
because of restrictive policies and internal devaluations. In this section, we give new 
estimations of FEERs for ten European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Greece) over the period 1994-2012 (see table 1). 
The FEER is defined as the exchange rate prevailing when the economy simultaneously 
reaches the external equilibrium and the internal equilibrium for all the trading partners. This 
measure was derived from a standard world trade model in which all the variables are 
endogenous except the external equilibrium (sustainable current account) and the internal 
equilibrium (full utilization of the productive potential). The external equilibrium is estimated 
with panel regression techniques. The internal equilibrium is reached when the output gap is 
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closed (see Jeong et al. (2010) for further details). 
In this new estimation the underlying current account is obtained by taking into account the 
delayed effects of past exchange rate variations (in t-1 and t-2), as it was done in the previous 
estimations, but also the effects of domestic output gap on imports and foreign output gap on 
exports, as it has been proposed by Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998). This second correction is 
more significant in the present period due to the size of the output gaps since 2008 (see 
appendix A for a short presentation of methodology and corrections made on underlying 
current accounts). 
Figure 1: Current account imbalances as percent of GDP 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF WEO October 2013. 
Since the early 2000s, we have assisted to a sharp increase of the heterogeneity of 
misalignments in the Eurozone (table 1). A split within the eurozone between some countries 
increasingly undervalued (like Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and others 
increasingly overvalued (like Greece, Portugal, Spain and France). On average between 2005 
and 2010, Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland have been undervalued by 13% while 
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Greece, Portugal, Spain and France have been overvalued by 23%. 
Table 1: Misalignments in real effective terms (in %) 
 
EU FRA GER ITA SPA AUT FIN IRL NLD PRT GRC 
1994 -3,4 3.1 -10.5 9.2 0.6 -3.1 -1.7 3.8 0.8 4.3 13.9 
1995 1,2 1.4 -9.4 11.2 8.8 -8.3 7.2 3.8 0.8 7.0 1.3 
1996 4,2 3.9 -4.8 9.4 -4.6 -9.2 9.3 0.8 0.4 -11.3 -12.5 
1997 3,5 15.2 -3.2 8.2 -0.8 -8.8 16.9 0.6 1.8 -19.3 -12.7 
1998 0,6 15.4 -5.2 5.1 -1.4 -3.5 17.4 -0.8 -2.2 -18.5 -8.4 
1999 2,0 19.5 -8.1 1.8 -6.9 -2.9 17.6 0.4 -0.7 -23.7 -17.8 
2000 0,1 7.4 -8.4 -0.7 -10.0 1.1 21.4 -2.2 -3.7 -28.7 -25.2 
2001 6,9 7.6 -3.5 -1.2 -13.0 -3.5 22.2 -5.4 -6.4 -34.3 -24.3 
2002 6,6 2.4 3.5 -4.2 -12.9 9.8 23.0 -6.2 -8.2 -27.4 -22.4 
2003 2,2 -3.0 2.2 -6.9 -13.6 2.9 12.0 -6.8 -3.0 -23.8 -11.8 
2004 6.6 -5.7 9.0 -1.9 -22.0 1.2 12.7 -7.2 -1.1 -33.8 1.0 
2005 1.8 -11.2 11.6 -1.2 -30.7 3.8 5.5 -7.3 1.6 -44.2 -4.6 
2006 0.3 -8.8 16.5 -0.7 -34.0 7.9 9.4 -5.1 6.1 -42.5 -5.1 
2007 0.1 -12.8 18.4 -0.3 -42.0 10.4 11.5 -11.1 3.1 -33.8 -7.4 
2008 -2.6 -19.8 14.3 -5.7 -46.7 12.6 4.5 -14.1 0.0 -45.9 -10.1 
2009 0.6 -11.6 16.3 -2.0 -21.4 7.2 -0.4 -2.5 2.1 -35.4 -0.4 
2010 1.6 -8.9 20.2 -3.2 -21.5 9.8 3.4 8.1 8.4 -26.8 -11.5 
2011 8.2 -15.4 16.9 -4.1 -19.5 6.9 -7.3 3.9 6.6 -22.1 -46.2 
2012 14.1 -14.1 19.9 4.3 -1.3 7.8 -5.2 13.0 7.1 2.7 -15.9 
Note: Forecasts for 2012 based on IMF WEO October 2013; See Jeong et al. (2010) for a complete description 
of the model of world trade and the methodology used to compute ERMs. Source: authors’ calculations. A 
positive (negative) number indicates an undervaluation (overvaluation) expressed in percent of the observed 
value. 
These intra-European exchange rate misalignments reflect a strong structural heterogeneity 
between European countries at several levels (nature of the international specialization, size 
and productivity of the firms, R&D effort, and qualification of the labor force). They are at 
the heart of the current problems of the eurozone. However, since the onset of the euro crisis 
in 2010, a reduction of misalignments is observed for most of the Southern European 
countries. Irish, Spanish, Italian and even Portuguese euros seem no more overvalued in 2012. 
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But Greek and French euros remain overvalued around 15% and German euro undervalued 
around 20%. These movements have been mainly driven by large real effective devaluations 
in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, as shown in figure 2 with the evolutions of the relative 
unit labor cost (RULC) i.e. the real effective exchange rates based on ULC. These politics of 
internal devaluation are very painful and has led to a deep recession in Greece, as in other 
Southern European countries, with a reduction of current deficits mainly due to the shrink of 
imports, but with limited improvement of the public finance.  
Figure 2: Real effective exchange rates based on unit labor cost 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on European Commission data, basis 100 in 2000. 
These evolutions can be analyzed in more details using other indicators of real effective 
exchange rates based on nominal unit wage cost (figure 3) and export price deflator (figure 4). 
In spite of large wage cut adjustment in Greece, the Greek euro remains overvalued. This 
implies that the Greek export firms have used the wage cuts mainly to increase their margins 
without improving their price competitiveness. To a less extent the Portuguese and Spanish 
firms have done the same, but with more success on the export shares for Spain, which can be 
explained by non-price competitiveness factors. On the opposite wage and employment 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
105 
110 
115 
120 
125 
130 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
Germany 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
 8 
adjustments have been very large in Ireland and have been accompanied by an improvement 
of export price competitiveness which is reflected in a slight undervaluation. Italy has faced a 
drift of its relative ULC and export price competitiveness without any attempt to adjust it in 
the recent period. The limited overvaluation of the Italian euro reflects non price 
competitiveness factors. 
Figure 3: Real effective exchange rates based on unit wage cost 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on European Commission data, basis 100 in 2000. 
Apart from the French case which will be analyzed more in detail below, Germany is the last 
country to examine. From 2000 to 2008 sharp wage and productivity adjustments have led to 
a large reduction of the German relative unit labor cost which has been preserved during the 
crisis. Export price competitiveness has also been improved, although to a lesser extent than 
the RULC which has allowed an improvement of the export margin of the German firms. 
2.2 The French deadlock 
The French case is interesting. French RULC and unit wage cost have followed an 
intermediate path without large drift, but without cost adjustments. Facing this evolution, 
export margins have been regularly reduced to preserve, and even improve, export price 
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competitiveness. This has not been sufficient to avoid an increasing overvaluation of the 
French euro, due to the weakness of non-price competitiveness. 
Figure 4: Real effective exchange rates based on export price deflator 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on European Commission data, basis 100 in 2000. 
Another way to illustrate these issues is to compare two estimations of the RULC, one 
measured in level using purchasing power parity (RULC), the other measured with the 
equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) and corresponding to an equilibrium value of the ULC 
(RULC*). These indicators have been estimated for France and Germany (figure 5). They 
show that the French RULC has remained during almost thirty years close to one, i.e. that the 
French unit labor cost was in level close to the ULC of the main partners. In that sense, it 
could be claimed that there was no problem of cost competitiveness, in spite of a slight drift 
during the 2000s. A more precise analysis leads to a different diagnosis. At the end of the 
2000s the French RULC was very close to the German one, in contrast with what was 
observed during the 1990s when the German RULC was quite higher than the French one. 
The French firms had at that time a cost advantage in contrast with the German firms which 
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suffered of a cost disadvantage. It helped the French firms to survive and compensate their 
insufficiency in matter of non-price competitiveness while the German firms partly 
compensated their cost disadvantage by non-price competitiveness advantage. Consequently, 
the overvaluation of the deutschmark (changed in German euro in 1999) remained limited. At 
the end of the 1990s the French RULC was under its equilibrium value, which illustrated the 
undervaluation of the Franc (changed in French euro in 1999). During the 1980s and 1990s 
the equilibrium value of the French ULC has appreciated progressively, which was reflecting 
some effort to re-structure the manufacturing sector, but also the declining position of our 
main competitor, the German economy which was engaged during the 1990s in a painful 
reunification. 
During the 2000s the reverse has been complete. The German equilibrium RULC* has 
appreciated, thanks to industrial restructuration (mainly with delocalization in Eastern 
Europe) and cost adjustments, which has led to a large undervaluation of the German euro. In 
sharp contrast, the French equilibrium RULC has depreciated due to a de-industrialization 
process and declining rates of investment and R&D. Without cost adjustments, as it has been 
seen, and, in spite of the reduction of the export margins, a structural overvaluation of the 
French euro has appeared. 
The French economy is clearly in a deadlock. There are three alternative issues. Like in other 
Southern European countries, cost adjustments through wage cut and productivity gains could 
be used. But as the social cost is high and their efficiency is limited, they will perpetuate the 
recession in France and in other European countries. They are not in the agenda of the present 
government. 
The parity of the euro franc could be depreciated. This would mean a complete change in the 
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European monetary regime, which is not impossible but raises many problems
1
. It is not also 
in the agenda of the present government. 
 
The third solution, which has been adopted, is the “employment-competitiveness tax rebate” 
(20 billion of euros, around 1% of GDP) followed by the “responsibility pact” in January 
2014 (10 billion more of reduction of social contributions). The idea is to reduce costs 
through tax rebate. The target of these measures is not clear and they raise, at least, two 
questions. If the government wants to improve the competitiveness, the measure is inaccurate 
as all the firms, including those of the non-tradable sector like banks and retailers can benefit 
of the tax rebate. Consequently, the transfer in favor of the tradable sector is too limited, 
compared with the cost disadvantage which prevails actually. 
Figure 5: Level (RULC) and equilibrium relative unit labor cost (RULC*)  
 
                                                 
1
 This is discussed in other papers (Mazier, 2013; Mazier and Valdecantos, 2014). 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on Duwicquet et alii (2013)’s data. We thank Anna Su for providing data 
assistance. 
A larger transfer would be necessary but could not be supported by the public finance. If the 
target is to improve employment, as it seems to be more the case with the “responsibility 
pact”, the past experiences show that efficiency is not warranted and the problem of cost-
competitiveness, which cannot be ignored, is not solved. The government is aware of these 
limits and has completed his array of measures by re-launching industrial policy measures 
(major industrial projects, innovation policy, etc.) to improve non-price competitiveness. This 
is welcome but this kind of measures takes a long time (around 10 years) to be fully 
operational. 
The risk is therefore that any target can be reached. The competitiveness problem will remain 
and financing the current deficit might become more difficult. Tax rebates could have a 
limited impact on employment, at least as the profit margins have been reduced during the 
crisis, especially for the export sector. The financing of the tax rebates will imply public 
expenditures cuts with a negative impact on activity. The more likely outcome would be a 
long lasting period of stagnation. That is why it is worthwhile to explore, using a SFC model 
of monetary union, alternative regimes at the European level to face this problem of intra-
European misalignments. 
3. SFC modeling of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union 
3.1. The structure of the model 
A two-country SFC model of a monetary union allows a consistent description of assets and 
liabilities of all associated real and financial flows. The monetary union is composed of two 
countries (N and S) with an asymmetry of size. The country N is five times larger than the 
country S. This configuration facilitates analyzing the adjustment mechanisms of the country 
S facing the rest of the monetary union. 
We introduce in the present model the possibility of public federal expenditures and 
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eurobonds. This will permit to investigate stabilizing effects of eurobonds. Firms accumulate 
both real and financial capital. They can finance their investments by non-distributed profits, 
bank loans or equities. Commercial banks are able to supply credit and to ration credit. A 
single central bank (ECB) refinances the commercial banks. Households hold banking 
deposits, bonds and equities. The two national governments issue bonds and Treasury bills. 
Lastly, the model has been calibrated to represent the structure of the European Monetary 
Union. 
 
Table 2: Balance sheet 
Households N Firms N State N Banks N Federal budget ECB Households S Firms S State S Banks S
Capital        +       +
Deposits       +   -      +    -
Currency       +   +         -      +    +
        -   +    +
  +       -    +
Refinancing   -    -
   + -   +
   +   + -
EuroBonds      +   +        -     +    +
 -  +   +
 +   -   +
   +   +   +   +
  -
   +   +   +   +
  -
Wealth         -        -    -    -         -      -       -     -    -
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bills
Equities
Credits
Bonds
NBD
N
hH
.N Nb Np  B
.S Sb Np  B
.N Ne hNp  E
.S Se hNp  E
NVH
NK
NL
.N Ne eNp  E
.N Nep  E
.S Se eNp  E
NV
.N Nbp  B
NBT
ND
NBD
NH
N
NL
S
NL
NRF
N
NBT
S
NBT
NVB
H
N SRF RF+ +
SBD
S
hH
.N Nb Sp  B
.S Sb Sp  B
.N Ne hSp  E
.S Se hSp  E
SVH
SK
SL
.N Ne eSp  E
.S Se eSp  E
.S Sep  E
SV
.S Sbp  B
SBT
SD
SBD
SH
N
SL
S
SL
SRF
N
SBT
S
SBT
SVB
EBTNb
EBTNh
EBTSh
EBTSb
EBT
ED
 
Table 2 describes the balance sheet in terms of assets (written with a positive sign) and 
liabilities (written with a negative sign) of each sector: households, firms, government, 
commercial banks, the single central bank and a federal budget. Beyond fixed capital (K), 
eight kinds of monetary or financial assets are distinguished
2
: bank deposits (BD) held by 
                                                 
2
 When there are two symbols (N and S), the subscript denotes the country where the asset is 
held, the superscript the country where the asset is issued. For example, BTN
S
 represents the 
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households, bonds issued by governments (pb.B) and held by households of both countries, 
loans (L) supplied by each commercial bank to firms of the two countries, equities issued by 
firms (pe.E) and held by households and firms of both countries, Treasury bills issued by each 
State (BT) and held by commercial banks of both countries, high powered money (H) held by 
households (Hh) as well as by commercial banks (reserve requirements), advances supplied by 
the central bank to commercial banks (RF) and finally eurobonds issued by a federal authority 
and held by banks and households. 
The present model relies on the main features of the contributions of Duwicquet and Mazier 
(2010, 2011) and Duwicquet et al. (2013). Nevertheless, several crucial changes are included 
to examine current developments in the eurozone crisis: 
• Interest rates on Treasury bills supplied by the State are endogenous. The demand of 
Treasury bills by private banks is an increasing function of interest rate. Thus, in case 
of an insufficient demand, this mechanism induces upward pressures on interest rates. 
• Budgetary policy is partially endogenous and is linked to financial markets. When 
interest rates on sovereign debt increase, the State can reduce public spending in 
reaction. 
• The possibility to increase intra-zone financing is introduced in order to reduce the 
pressure on interest rates. This can be achieved through foreign banks purchases of 
public bonds or Treasury bills, through the European Stability Mechanism or even 
through direct intervention of the central bank on the public bond market.  
• The role of eurobonds is examined in two ways. On the one hand, eurobonds are 
aimed at pooling a part of sovereign debt in the eurozone. On the other hand, 
eurobonds could be used to finance European investment projects in various sectors 
                                                                                                                                                        
amount of bills held by country N and issued by the country S. 
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namely education, health and innovation (see Mazier and Petit (2013) for some new 
proposals). 
Baseline scenario 
The model dynamics relies essentially on the investment function. As we can see below, 
investment reacts positively to the rate of profit (UP/K-1) and to variation of aggregate 
demand (ΔY/Y-1). It responds negatively to the debt structure (L/K-1) and to credit costs (rl). 
1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4
N d N N N
N N N N
I UP Y L
 = k  + k *  + k *  - k *  - k *rl
K K Y K− − − −
∆
 
-1I K  = accumulation rate, dI  = desired investment, K  = fixed capital stock, UP = 
undistributed profit, -1UP K  = non-financial profit rate, L  = debt, lr  = credit cost, Y  = GDP. 
At the macroeconomic level, an increase in investment spending will generate more profits. 
These profits will be, on the one hand, distributed in part to shareholders (here, households 
and other firms) and, on the other hand, retained. 
The household consumption function includes a positive wealth effect. This wealth effect 
describes the behavior of households which target a constant ratio between wealth and 
disposable income. 
10 1 2
N N NC  = a  + a  * YHSh  + a  * VH−  
VH  = households’ wealth, YHSh  = disposable income with capital gains. 
The disposable income of households is defined as the sum of after-tax labor incomes (wages) 
and after-tax capital incomes (interest rates and dividends). A part of disposable income 
augmented with capital gains is consumed (the marginal propensity to consume is equal to 
0.75) whereas the residual saving corresponds to bank deposits, money holdings and to 
financial assets (bonds supplied by the State and equities supplied by private firms). The 
financial wealth covers a large array of financial assets (bank deposit, money, equities and 
bonds).  
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Regarding the monetary sphere, the central bank supplies money and provides an unlimited 
amount of financing to private banks at the key interest rate acting as the lender of last resort. 
The central bank does not make any profit as in Godley and Lavoie (2007). Thus interests 
paid to the Central Bank are equal to taxes paid to the State. This is in line with the practice of 
most modern central banks in the world economy. Commercial banks supply the entire 
amount of demanded credit. The credit market is open to foreign banks. We suppose that 
banks of the smaller country (country S) do not lend to firms of the larger country N (LS
N
 = 
0). Bank loans are allocated between domestic and foreign firms relatively to their respective 
trade openness. The interest rate on bank loans is endogenous and depends on the lagged 
value of public bonds’ rate of each country. 
 
Treasury bills play a key role in the model resolution. Supply of Treasury bills balances the 
gap between public deficit and bonds issuance thus: 
1*
N N N N N N NBT G rn BT T TB TEB pbn B−∆ = + − − − − ∆  
BT = issued Treasury bills, G = public expenditures, rn = interest rate on Treasury bills, pb.B 
= bonds, T = taxes paid by households, TB = taxes paid by commercial banks, TEB = taxes 
paid by the Central Bank. 
Banks purchase a limited amount of Treasury bills with a demand which depends positively 
on the rate of interest. Thus interest rates become endogenous, as they adjust supply of 
Treasury bills determined by the public deficit (which has to be financed) and private demand 
of Treasury bills in each country. 
Bills issued by the southern country and domestically held in the private sector (BTS
S
) as well 
as bills held in the rest of the union (BTN
S
) depends on the interest differential between the 
two countries: 
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1 . 2 .
S
S
ss ssS
BT
a rs a rn
Y
= −  
1 . 2 .
S
N
ns nsN
BT
a rs a rn
Y
= −  
By summing demands of these two countries, we obtain the global demand for Treasury bills 
issued by the southern country: ( ) ( )1 . 2 . . 1 . 2 . .S S Nss ss ns nsBT a rs a rn Y a rs a rn Y= − + −  
The interest rate on Treasury bills issued by the southern country becomes endogenous and 
we can write: 
2 . . 2 . .
1 . 1 .
S S N
ss ns
S N
ss ns
BT a rn Y a rn Y
rs
a Y a Y
+ += +  
Regarding the rest of the union (the northern country), we assume that the southern country 
does not hold bills issued by the northern country which finances its public deficit only 
domestically: 
0NSBT =  
N N
NBT BT=  
The global demand for Treasury bills issued by the northern country depends on the level of 
interest rate (rn) and the national income (Y
N
): ( )1 .
2
N
nnN
N
nn
rn a Y
BT
b
−=  
Consequently, we have the following interest rate determination for the northern country in 
the model: 
2 .
1
N
nn
nn N
b BT
rn a
Y
= +  
Interest rates on private banks loans depend on interest rates on T-Bills and on their own 
lagged value: ( )1 1. 1 .rln rln a a rn− −= − +  
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( )1 1. 1 .rls rls a a rs− −= − +   
After an increase of public deficit, banks still finance the public deficit. However the level of 
interest rates is now higher. This tightening of financial conditions is partially transmitted to 
rates on bank loans granted to firms. 
Our model represents a monetary union characterized by a sluggish growth in the baseline 
scenario (around 1 percent per year). From this baseline scenario, we simulate an asymmetric 
loss of competitiveness in the southern country due to an exchange rate misalignment. To 
illustrate the loss competitiveness, the term TI is equal to 10 between periods 10 and 50: 
( ) ( )0 1 2 2   log    .log  .log  .logN SN Nn n N SW TI W TIIM Y Y Yµ µ µ µ   + −= + + −        
( ) ( )0 1 2 2   log    .log  .log  .logN SS Ss s N SW TI W TIIM Y Y Yµ µ µ µ   − += + + −        
This shock deteriorates the current account of the southern country and improves external 
trade of the northern country. Consequently, we observe a decline of national income in the 
South and an increase of national income in the North. In order to investigate the current 
developments of the eurozone crisis, we compare the effect of this shock in different versions 
of the model. In addition to the baseline scenario, four versions of the model will be 
examined. 
3.2. Alternative scenarios of economic policies  
Scenario 1: Budget cuts 
Here, public expenditures become endogenous and react to rising interest rate on Treasury 
bills: 
1 11.018 ( )
N N NG G rn BTβ− −= − ∗ ∗∗ ; 1 11.018 ( )S S SG G rs BTβ− −= ∗ − ∗ ∗  
In line with objectives of the revised Stability and Growth Pact as well as aims of the Fiscal 
Compact, we assume that the government targets to reach a debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent in t 
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= 50. To achieve this challenge, the government progressively reduces its public expenditures. 
The speed of public expenditures reduction is governed by the evolution of interest rates. The 
year of the shock, public expenditures decrease by 0.2 percent of GDP relatively to the 
baseline scenario. In the baseline scenario, publics expenditures amount to 20 percent of GDP 
in t = 50. In the first scenario, they drop to 12 percent of GDP in t = 50. 
Scenario 2: Intra zone financing 
We investigate, here, implications of financial support granted by the northern country to the 
southern country. In the wake of a loss of competitiveness in the southern country, the 
issuance of public securities will rise to finance the deficit. We assume that private banks of 
the northern country will sustain this supplementary demand to bring down interest rates. This 
scenario can also be seen as an illustration of the European Stability Mechanism where 
northern countries grant loans with low rates of interest to southern countries. Similar effects 
are also expected if the Central Bank purchases directly Treasury bills of southern countries. 
In each case, the southern country receives financial aid to reduce the debt burden 
substantially. 
Scenario 3: Issuance of eurobonds   
In this scenario, eurobonds are issued in order to mutualize partially sovereign debt of 
southern countries. We assume that there is threshold (a debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent) from 
which eurobonds are issued to finance public debt in the eurozone as a substitute to national 
debt. Nevertheless, national governments have to pay interest on issued eurobonds. Southern 
countries must be committed to stabilize their public debt. 
( )1. .N N N N N N N N NBT G r BT T TB TEB pb B−∆ = + − − − − ∆  if 0.6 .N e ENND r BTY < +  
( )1. .S S S S S S S S SBT G r BT T TB TEB pb B−∆ = + − − − − ∆  if 0.6 .S e ESSD r BTY < +  
Each government may appeal the issuance of Eurobonds (BTEN for North’s government and BTES 
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for South’s government). ( )1. .EN N N N N N N N NBT G r BT T TB TEB pb B−∆ = + − − − − ∆  if 0.6NNDY >  
( )1. .ES S S S S S S S SBT G r BT T TB TEB pb B−∆ = + − − − − ∆  if 0.6SSDY >  
The global offering of Eurobonds is obtained by the sum of the two countries 
E EN ESBT BT BT= +  
Eurobonds are purchased by domestic banks (BTNb
E
 for North and BTSb
E 
for South) and 
domestic households (BTNh
E 
for North and BTSh
E
 for South): 
EN E E
Nh NbBT BT BT= +  
ES E E
Sh SbBT BT BT= +  
Demand for Eurobonds simply depends on the interest rate (r
e
) and the level of GDP of the 
entire eurozone (Y
E
 = Y
N
 + Y
S
). ( )0 .
1
e E
eE
e
r a Y
BT
a
−=  
In the model, we use the following determination of interest rates: 
0 1 .
E
e
e e E
BT
r a a
Y
= +  
Scenario 4: Issuance of eurobonds and European projects 
To complete the previous scenario, eurobonds are used as a tool to finance European projects 
in growth sectors. Southern countries as well as northern countries can use eurobonds in order 
to stimulate their economic growth. 
3.3. Adjustments in monetary union and economic policies 
In figure 6, we can observe the evolution of interest rates and public debt in the southern 
country in the baseline scenario (loss of competitiveness in the southern country) and in the 
four versions of the model. 
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Figure 6: Evolutions of public debt and interest rate in the southern country 
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
In the baseline scenario, we assume that any adjustment mechanism is used to face the loss of 
competitiveness. Thus, this loss of competitiveness widens the external deficit and in the same 
time increases the need of external financing. In addition, the negative impact of trade deficit 
on the GDP implies a diminution of taxes collected by the government and thus an increase of 
the public deficit. On Treasury bills market, interest rates increase alongside the debt increase 
and the slowdown of GDP. This “snowball” effect implies a tremendous increase in debt 
levels (370 % of GDP in t = 50) and of interest rates (13 % in t = 50). 
In order to eschew another “Greek drama”, European authorities can react by implementing 
various economics policies to achieve more sustainable adjustments. 
In the first scenario, the government tries to reduce its public expenditures in order to prevent 
an increase of interest rates. The long run purpose of this policy is to reach a debt-to-GDP 
ratio limited to 60 %. However, due to the Keynesian multiplier effect, public expenditures 
reduction puts a huge strain on economic activity as we can see in figure 7. Interest rates are 
reduced compared with the baseline scenario but still rise in the medium run and reach 4 % in 
t = 50 due to a smaller demand of Treasury bills induced by the decline of the activity. 
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Figure 7: Relative GDP and current account in the southern country 
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
In the second scenario, we assume that intra-zone financing is large thanks to a facilitated 
demand from private banks of the Northern countries or to the implementation of a European 
Stability Mechanism. This allows to keep interest rates at low level (2.8 % in t = 50) in spite 
of a huge increase of public debt-to-GDP ratio (160 % in t = 50). The negative impact on 
economic growth is largely offset in the long run but the competitiveness problem is not 
solved (figure 7). We can notice that the Treaty ratified in March 2012 which gives an 
institutional background to the European Stability Mechanism stipulates that members States 
must reach a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 % in the medium run. The results of the second scenario 
will be greatly affected if the objective fixed by the European Stability Mechanism was 
respected. In such a case the result in terms of relative growth rates would be largely similar 
to those of the first scenario. 
The third and the fourth scenario analyze the impact of an issuance of eurobonds in the 
eurozone. We can observe that interest rates increase less rapidly in the fourth scenario than 
the third scenario. In the fourth scenario, eurobonds finance investments in growth sectors 
therefore economic growth is stronger and upward pressures on interest rates are weaker. 
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These growth gaps can be observed in the figure 7. We compute adjustments on GDP thanks 
to the following formula: 
    
  
 
with competitiveness loss without competitiveness loss
without competitiveness loss
GDP GDP
RelativeGDP
GDP
= −  
Initially, the GDP drops after the negative competitiveness shock. The implementation of 
European projects financed by eurobonds (scenario 4) absorbs completely the competitiveness 
loss in the long run as GDP returns to its value before the shock in t = 50. Eurobonds issuance 
to mutualize partially sovereign debt (scenario 3) permits a partial adjustment. We can notice 
that intra-zone financing (scenario 2) appears to be more efficient than eurobonds issuance 
alone (scenario 3). The implementation of a European Stability Mechanism aimed at 
providing low interest rates to governments and firms stimulates investment. In terms of 
relative growth, the worst case is the first scenario where governments implement drastic 
budget cuts in order to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 % in the long run. The GDP drops 
by 35 % in relative terms in t = 50. The slowdown of economic activity induces a decrease of 
imports and then a massive adjustment of the current account balance. Without any policy 
reactions (baseline scenario) after the competitiveness loss, external deficits of southern 
countries steadily increase and reach 8 % of GDP in t = 50. In other scenarios, we observe a 
stabilization of the external deficit around 2 % in the long run. 
Figure 8: Relative GDP and current account in the northern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations 
In figure 8, we can analyze the consequences of the various scenarios in the northern country 
in terms of growth and public debt. Again, drastic budget cuts in the southern country have 
negative impact on economic activity even in the northern country. In the long run, the fall of 
GDP will bring public debt to 95 % of GDP. In other scenarios, public debt increases less 
thanks to a stronger growth, particularly in the third scenario. 
According to our numerical simulations, issuance of eurobonds constitutes a useful tool to 
reignite growth in the entire eurozone. Figure 9 shows levels of public debt and evolution of 
interest rates on Treasury bills and eurobonds in the third and the fourth scenario. 
As growth is stronger in the fourth scenario, interest rates on national T-bills are lower when 
eurobonds play a role in financing the real economy. Conversely, the interest rate on 
eurobonds is slightly higher in the fourth scenario (2.1 %) than in the third scenario (1.8 %). 
Regarding levels of public debt, again, European debt in eurobonds is higher in the fourth (28 
% of GDP) relatively to the third scenario (18 % of GDP). Nevertheless, European 
indebtedness remains sustainable as well as national indebtedness in spite of the fact that 
national governments have to pay interest on these issued eurobonds. 
Figure 9: Interest rate and public debt in scenario 3 and 4 
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Source: authors’ calculations 
4. Conclusion 
If European authorities do not react by implementing new economic policies to achieve 
sustainable adjustments, a competitiveness loss in southern countries due to exchange rates 
misalignments will induce stagnation in southern countries and diverging current account 
imbalances between southern and northern countries 
Increasing intra-European financing by banks of northern countries or by the European 
Stability Mechanism or even by the intervention of the ECB itself could contribute to reduce 
the debt burden and induce a partial recovery. But the problem of competitiveness of the 
southern countries would not be solved and public debt would increase (scenario 2). 
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Implementation of euro-bonds as a tool to partly mutualize European sovereign debt would 
have a rather similar positive impact, but with a public debt limited to 60% of GDP, which 
could be considered a an important advantage (scenario 3). Furthermore, euro-bonds could 
also be used to finance large European projects which could impulse a stronger recovery in 
the entire euro zone with stabilized current account imbalances (scenario 4). To improve non 
price competitiveness, it could (and should) be completed by more structural policies 
(industrial and innovation policies) which are complex to implement and long lasting. 
However, the settlement of a European Debt Agency in charge of the issuance of the euro- 
bonds would face strong political obstacles. The northern countries fear that euro-bonds 
would give to the southern countries the opportunity to continue irrelevant policies. They 
would ask that the launching of euro-bonds would be accompanied by more restrictive fiscal 
policy in the respect of the Stability pact. Actually, the European Stability Mechanism 
organizes the rescue of countries facing difficulties only under the condition of a strict control 
of the public finance. In such a configuration, euro-bonds as tool to mutualize the debt would 
not be of a large help compared with the present institutional framework. On the opposite the 
southern countries could argue that a part of the debt induced by the overvaluation of their 
euro could be financed by eurobonds without being subjected to more constraints linked to the 
Stability pact whose cost presently appears too high. 
Last, the efficiency of these institutional innovations inside the monetary union could be 
compared with an alternative framework where the possibility of intra-European exchange 
rate adjustments would be reintroduced thanks to a new type of monetary regime 
(cohabitation of a global euro with national euros, new European Monetary System with an 
euro reduced to a simple ECU, exit of the Germany or of southern countries). These various 
monetary regimes are a more straightforward solution to the problem of competitiveness of 
southern countries and allow a more efficient adjustment at short term, with more balanced 
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growth regime at medium term (Mazier and Valdecantos, 2014). They could also be 
completed by structural policies to improve non price competitiveness. However the main 
difficulty raised by this alternative strategy is the transition period which would be delicate to 
manage with the risk of capital outflows and bank crisis.  
Appendix A: Methodological note on the underlying current account 
A simple foreign trade model is used for all the countries with export and import equations for 
goods and services related to real exchange rates, domestic output gap for import and foreign 
output gap for export. Lagged effects of exchange rate variations are spread on three years (t: 
60%; t+1: 25% and t+2: 15%). Export price in domestic currency is independent from the real 
exchange rate while on the contrary import price in domestic currency depends immediately 
and completely of the exchange rate variation. The current account in % of GDP can be 
written: ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
1 20,6 0,25 0 15,m x
m x
CA Y M Y X Y R R R
M Y R
M Y YGAP X Y YGAPF
α β β
ψ ψ
− − = + + + + −− +  
With YGAPF: average output gap of the main partners, R: logarithm of the real exchange rate 
(↑R = depreciation), βx, βm: long term export and import price elasticities, ψx, ψm: long term 
export and import volume elasticities. 
In case of real appreciation (↓R), import in volume increases while exports decreases with 
lagged effects of the exchange rate variations but current account is improved thanks to 
cheaper imports. Last rising domestic output gap has a negative impact on current account 
while foreign output gap has an opposite effect. The underlying current account is the current 
account corrected by the effects of past and present exchange rate variations and by the effects 
of the domestic and foreign output gaps: 
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( ) ( )( )UND m xCA Y M Y X Y RM Y Rα β β = + + −  
By substitution we obtain: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 10,4 0,15UND m xm xCA Y CA Y M Y X Y R RM Y YGAP X Y YGAPFβ βψ ψ − = + + ∆ + ∆ + −  
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